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IS ALTRUISM EVOLUTIONARILY STABLE?




We develop an evolutionary approach to explain altruistic preferences. Given
their preferences, individuals interact rationally with each other. By comparing the
success of players with dierent preferences, we investigate whether evolution favors
altruistic or selsh attitudes. The outcome depends on whether the individuals'
interactions are strategic complements or substitutes. Altruism and self-interest
are context dependent.
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There is an abundance of observations showing that individuals do not always pursue
self-interest: People risking their own life to rescue others, soldiers voluntarily going to
war, the many forms of charity etc. These observations can be made consistent with
standard economic theory by postulating utility functions that include the well- being of
others in addition to the own one. Yet, this only rephrases the question of why individu-
als behave in this way. Instead of explaining altruistic behavior, one now has to explain
why people sometimes have altruistic preferences. It is this question that we want to
address.
We adopt an evolutionary approach to investigate whether altruism may have evolved
in humans through a process of natural or cultural selection. Formally, the degree of
altruism is expressed by a preference parameter describing how much an individual cares
for the success of others. The range of possible parameters includes pure self-interest
as the special case where an agent's objective is identical to his private success. In
the interaction with others, each player rationally selects a strategy to maximize his
preferences. As a result, in equilibrium each player's eective success depends on the
altruistic attitudes of all the involved players. This allows us to compare the success of
players with dierent preference parameters. In an evolutionary environment, players
with a higher expected success are less likely to be eliminated. Since success is related
to preferences, we can study the question of whether evolution favors altruistic or selsh
attitudes. Altruism is said to be evolutionarily stable if it survives evolutionary selection.
Instead of studying directly the evolution of behavior, which is the usual approach in
evolutionary biology1 and in evolutionary game theory (see, for instance, Hammerstein
and Selten (1994)), we consider rational behavior for given preferences. These prefer-
ences determine the players' behavior and their eective success via their eect on the
outcome of strategic interactions. By assuming rational behavior and applying the con-
cept of evolutionary stability (see Maynard Smith (1982)) to preferences rather than to
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strategies, we endogenously determine preferences. Our approach thus oers a way of
endogenizing individual objective functions, which neoclassical theory usually treats as
exogenous.2
Our analysis of individual interactions yields two insights: First, a comparison of
the interaction between altruists and the interaction between egoists reveals that the
altruists achieve a higher material payo than the egoists. This is so because altruistic
preferences internalize some externalities in the game between the players. Second, when
an altruist interacts with an egoist, the altruist's material payo is lower than the ego-
ist's payo. This nding is in line with the conventional view that altruistic preferences
reduce the individual's success, while at the same time increasing the opponent's success.
The second result is often used as an argument that altruism cannot possibly evolve
by natural selection. Yet, this argument does not directly address evolutionary con-
siderations. For the process of natural selection, the relevant question is whether an
egoistic mutant facing a population of altruists is more successful than the altruists
among themselves. Altruism will be evolutionarily stable if an egoist in the interaction
with an altruist receives a lower material payo than an altruist. In our model, this
depends on the strategic dependence between the players. Altruism turns out to be
evolutionarily stable only if the game exhibits strategic complementarities in the sense
of Bulow et. al. (1985). This suggests that preferences may be context dependent. Situ-
ational factors may decide whether individuals are motivated by altruism or self-interest.
As Frank (1987, 1988) and Schelling (1978), our analysis emphasizes the strategic role
of preferences and emotions. A player's preferences aect not only his own equilibrium
behavior but also the behavior of his opponent. Depending on the type of interaction,
this eect can be either benecial or harmful for a player with altruistic preferences. As
a result, natural selection favors altruism in the case of strategic complements but not in
the case of strategic substitutes. The strategic role of preferences distinguishes our ap-
proach from alternative explanations of altruism that rely on `kin selection' arguments.
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These arguments show that evolution can sustain altruism between genetically linked
individuals (see, e.g. Bergstrom and Stark (1993)).
The following section describes the interaction between individuals and denes their
success resulting from their behavior. Section 3 studies the interaction between egoistic
players and discusses eciency implications. Altruistic preferences are introduced in
section 4, where we also study the impact of preferences on the equilibrium outcome.
Section 5 investigates the evolutionary stability of altruism. In section 6 we extend our
conclusions to a more general framework. Finally, section 7 concludes and discusses
extensions.
2 Success and Behavior
Consider a population whose members interact with each other in pairs. All members are
identical and so the interaction between a pair of individuals is described by a symmetric
game. In this game, one of the players is labelled as player 1 and the other is labelled as
player 2. Player 1's choice of action is denoted by x  0; player 2 chooses some action
y  0: Each player's material payo or evolutionary success depends on the joint actions
(x; y) according to
U1(x; y)  x(ky +m  x); U2(x; y)  y(kx+m  y); (1)
where the parameters k and m are assumed to satisfy the restriction
  1 < k < 1 and m > 0: (2)
The function Ui() does not necessarily represent player i's subjective utility or his pref-
erences. In the interaction with his opponent, player i seeks to maximize the utility
Vi(x; y): The function Vi(); which may dier from Ui(); will be dened in Section 4.
The parametric specication of payos allows us to derive a closed form solution for
the players' equilibrium success. Assumption (2) together with the specication of the
utility function Vi() in Section 4 guarantees that the equilibrium of the game between
the two individuals is unique. Also, the constraints x  0 and y  0 are never binding.
4
The specication of material payos in (1) is suciently general to illustrate the main
arguments of our analysis; we consider more general payo functions in section 6.
By (1), each individual's success depends not only on his own action but also on the
choice of the other player. If k > 0 the game exhibits positive externalities because a
higher action by player i increases the success of player j: Negative externalities occur
if k < 0: The simplest example is a production game with externalities, where x and y
denote the players' eort or input decisions. Player 1's success can then be dened as the
dierence between his output, x(ky+m); and his (quadratic) eort cost, x2: Equivalently,
in the presence of cost externalities, his output is mx and his cost is x(ky  x): Positive
production externalities may not only result from technological interdependence; they
also occur when agents share the joint output of their individual production eorts or if
their eorts contribute to the production of a public good. Negative cost externalities
arise naturally when the players exploit a common resource.
Several authors have used evolutionary arguments to explain the market behavior
of rms (see, e.g. Penrose (1952) and Winter (1971)). We can apply our approach to
the standard models of oligopolistic competition by identifying a rm's success with its
prots: Player 1 and 2 are engaged in a symmetric duopoly game with heterogeneous
products and linear demand functions. In a Cournot market, the actions x and y would
represent the rms' quantity choices. Their products are imperfect substitutes for all
k 2 ( 1; 0) and their prices are m+ ky   x and m+ kx  y: In a Bertrand market, the
rms would compete by choosing prices x and y; respectively. They face the demand
functions m+ ky x and m+kx y and their products are imperfect substitutes for all
k 2 (0; 1): Thus, the payos in (1) can be interpreted as the Cournot or Bertrand prots
in a symmetric duopoly market with zero production costs.
As a benchmark, we dene a symmetric optimum by actions (x̂; ŷ) that maximize the
players' joint success, i.e.
(x̂; ŷ) 2 argmax
x;y
[U1(x; y) + U2(x; y)]: (3)
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Since  1 < k < 1; this optimum is well-dened and determined by the necessary and
sucient rst-order conditions x = (2ky +m)=2 and y = (2kx+m)=2: Therefore,
x̂ = ŷ =
m
2  2k




Typically, the presence of externalities prevents the players from reaching the outcome
(x̂; ŷ) through individual preference maximization. In the following two sections, we
investigate the relation between altruistic preferences and this ineciency.
3 Equilibrium with Egoistic Preferences
An egoistic player seeks to maximize his private success. He shows no concern for the
success of his partner. That is, player i acts egoistically if his subjective utility satises
Vi(x; y) = Ui(x; y): Since the players interact non-cooperatively, each of them chooses
his action taking the action of the other as given. This results in actions (~x; ~y) that
constitute a Nash equilibrium of the game. Accordingly,
~x 2 argmax
x
U1(x; ~y); ~y 2 argmax
y
U1(~x; y): (5)
The players' best-response functions are given by
~x = 0:5(ky +m); ~y = 0:5(kx+m): (6)
To characterize the type of strategic interdependence, it will be useful to employ the ter-
minology of Bulow et. al. (1985): For k > 0; the reaction functions are upwards sloping
and the game exhibits strategic complementarities. If k < 0; the game exhibits strate-
gic substitutes because the reaction functions are downwards sloping. For instance, the
Cournot game discussed in Section 2 induces strategic substitutes, while the Bertrand
game leads to strategic complements.
The players' reactions generate the following equilibrium actions and payos:
~x = ~y =
m
2   k





As a result Ui(~x; ~y) < Ui(x̂; ŷ); i = 1; 2; unless k = 0: The reason is, of course, that
with egoistic behavior each player ignores the impact of his action on the other player's
success. This kind of externality explains why ~x = ~y < x̂ = ŷ if k > 0; and ~x = ~y > x̂ = ŷ
if k < 0:
Usually, one denes evolutionary stability in terms of strategies rather than
preferences.3 The denition of an evolutionarily stable strategy implies immediately that
this strategy constitutes a symmetric Nash equilibrium. In fact, if a symmetric Nash
equilibrium is `strict' in the sense that the players' best responses are unique, then the
equilibrium strategy is also evolutionarily stable. By (6) the equilibrium (~x; ~y) is strict
and, since ~x = ~y; it is symmetric. Therefore, only the strategy ~x is evolutionarily stable.
That is, only the egoistic behavior ~x = ~y survives selection of the most successful strat-
egy. To explain the evolution of altruism, one has to adopt an alternative method. This
is done by our `indirect' evolutionary approach, which applies the idea of evolutionary
selection to preferences instead of strategies.
4 Altruistic Preferences
A player is altruistic when his preferences reect some concern for the other player's
success. We describe such preferences by
V1(x; y) = U1(x; y) + (1  )U2(x; y); V2(x; y) = U2(x; y) + (1   )U1(x; y): (8)
Accordingly, the concern that players 1 and 2 express for the other player's success is
represented by the weights 1  and 1 ; respectively. If ;  < 1; the players are said
to be altruistic. This formulation of altruism has been employed already by Edgeworth
(1881, p. 53), who called the values (1 )= and (1 )= the `coecients of eective
sympathy'. In what follows, we restrict these coecients to lie in the unit interval by
considering only values of  and  such that












































































































Figure 1: Altruism and Equilibrium Behavior
That is, each player is taken to weigh his own success at least as much as the opponent's
success. We maintain the assumption of common knowledge to analyse the game be-
tween the   and the  player. This means, not only the material payos but also the
preference parameters  and  are commonly known by the players. We will discuss the
signicance of this assumption later in this section and in section 7.
Altruism inuences the strategic interactions between the players even though it does
not directly aect their success as dened by (1). Altruism has an indirect impact on the
players' success since their behavior depends on the parameters  and : Each player

















Altruistic preferences shift a player's best response function upwards if k > 0; and down-
wards if k < 0: For k > 0; this is illustrated in Figure 1. The gure depicts player 1's best
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response for given parameter values  = 1 and  < 1: Similarly, player 2's behavior is
represented for two dierent values of : The intuition for this eect is that an altruistic
player internalizes, at least partially, the externality of his behavior on the other player's
success. This induces him to select a higher action with positive externalities and a lower
action with negative externalities.
The equilibrium of the game between two players with preference parameters  and








In Figure 1 the equilibrium is determined as the intersection of the players' best re-
sponse function. For  =  = 1; this is the point (~x; ~y): In a game between two altruists
(x; y) is realized as ; < 1: As the gure illustrates, this outcome is closer to the
optimum (x̂; ŷ) than the egoistic equilibrium (~x; ~y):
For what follows, it is important to notice that each player's preference parameter
not only aects his own equilibrium behavior but also the opponent's choice of action.
Since the players are engaged in a non-cooperative game, each of them bases his decision
on his knowledge about the other player's attitudes. Following Schelling (1978, p. 229),
who calls \a behavioral propensity [...] strategic if it inuences others by aecting their
expectations," we refer to the dependence of x on  and of y on  as the `strategic'
eect of altruism. This strategic eect is consistent with the psychological evidence that
individuals do not act uniformly against other individuals; rather, they condition their
own behavior on the attitudes of those with whom they interact.4 This, of course, pre-
sumes that they can anticipate the attitudes of their opponent. Preferences can have
a strategic eect only if, at least to some extent, they are communicated to the other
player. In this sense, our analysis refers to environments where the players learn about
each other before choosing their actions. In fact, as Frank (1987, 1988) argues, many
observable physical symptoms may provide some indication of a person's aective con-
dition. These symptoms include posture, the rate of respiration, the pitch and timbre
of the voice, and facial muscle tone and expression. Also, he reports some experimental
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evidence that, even on the basis of brief encounters involving strangers, subjects are
adept at predicting the behavior of their opponent (see Frank (1988), ch. 7).
Using (12), we can determine the direction of the strategic eect. As @x=@ < 0
and @y=@ < 0 for all k 6= 0; the opponent's equilibrium action will be the higher the
more altruistically inclined a player is. In the case of positive externalities (k > 0);
therefore, the strategic eect has a positive impact on the altruistic player's success. Ef-
fectively, the opponent will choose a more favorable action because he interacts with an
altruist. If k < 0; however, the strategic eect turns out to be disadvantageous: Player
i's altruism induces player j to choose a higher action and this reduces player j's success.
Can a population of altruistic players reach a higher level of success than egoistic play-
ers? We answer this question by considering the outcome of the interaction between two
players with identical preference parameters. A comparison with the egoistic outcome
and the symmetric optimum shows that, for all 1=2 <  < 1;
~x = ~y < x(;) = y(;) < x̂ = ŷ; if k > 0; (13)
~x = ~y > x(;) = y(;) > x̂ = ŷ; if k < 0: (14)
Altruism shifts the equilibrium outcome closer towards optimal behavior. In fact, in the
extreme case  = 1=2 the players' equilibrium actions become identical to the symmetric
optimum. This has the following implication for the players' success.
Proposition 1: Let k 6= 0: Then a population of altruistic players reaches a higher level
of success than a population of egoists, i.e. Ui(~x; ~y) < Ui(x
(;); y(;)); i = 1; 2; if
 < 1:
Proposition 1 shows that altruism produces more ecient outcomes.5 Yet, this does
not mean that an altruistically inclined actor is more successful than a player who acts
on egoistic principles. Indeed, the conventional view is that altruistic behavior reduces
the actor's success while enhancing the success of others. The following result, which
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follows from Lemma 7 in the Appendix, conrms this intuition.
Proposition 2: Let k 6= 0: Then in the interaction between two players, the
more altruistically motivated player is less successful than his opponent. That is
U1(x
(;); y(; )) < U2(x
(; ); y(; )); for all  < :
An altruist is willing to reduce his own success in order to increase the success of
others. Therefore, one might conclude that self-interest has a higher survival value
than altruism. Yet, Proposition 2 presents only one consideration that is important for
evolutionary selection. As Proposition 1 indicates, a population consisting largely of
altruists will perform better than a population of egoists. An egoist within a population
of altruists may have a relatively low expected success because the altruists among
themselves attain a higher level of success than the egoist against the altruists. In fact,
even an altruist interacting with an egoist may have a higher success than an egoist who
faces another egoist. In the following section we will address the issue of evolutionary
preference selection by using the concept of evolutionary stability.
5 The Stability of Altruism
Can altruism emerge in an evolutionary process where only the most successful players
survive? By Proposition 1, a population of altruists is more successful than a popula-
tion of egoists. But this does not necessarily mean that altruism is evolutionarily stable.
When an egoist invades a population of altruists and performs better than his opponents,
then egoism will spread out and eliminate altruistic behavior in the process of evolution.
Conversely, an altruist may successfully invade a population of egoists if he does better
than the egoists against each other.
To study the evolutionary stability of altruism, we employ the `indirect' evolution-
ary approach, which is schematically presented in Figure 2. In the previous section we
studied the equilibrium behavior of two players with preference parameters  and ; re-













Figure 2: Evolutionary Selection of Preferences
evolutionary selection favors the more successful players, players with lower material
payos will become extinct. In this way, preferences are selected for their capacity to
generate material payos.
To complete our analysis, we investigate whether a monomorphic population of players
with parameter  is immune against invading mutant players with a dierent preference
parameter. In what follows, R(; ) denotes a player's success when he has the altruism
parameter  while his opponent has the parameter : Since the interaction between these
players results in the equilibrium (x(;); y(; )); we get
R(; )  U1(x
(; ); y(; )): (15)
The mutant space M = [1=2; 1] is the set of all possible values for the parameters 
and : The function R() together with the set M denes a symmetric evolutionary
game. This game allows us to study the evolutionary stability of a preference parameter
by using the concept of evolutionarily stable strategies (ESS, see Maynard Smith (1982)).
Denition: A preference parameter  2 [1=2; 1] is called evolutionarily stable if
R(; )  R(;) for all  2 [1=2; 1]; and (16)
R(; ) > R(;) whenever R(; ) = R(;): (17)
These conditions capture the idea that a population with parameter  cannot be
invaded by a small minority with deviant parameter  : According to the rst require-
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ment, an evolutionarily stable parameter  is a best reply against itself. Any  mutant
invading a society of -players cannot be more successful than the members of the so-
ciety. If several parameters are equally successful, the second condition rules out that
an alternative best reply  6=  can spread out in the population: Since  is better
against  than  itself,  will be eliminated as soon as it becomes more frequent within
the population.
The ESS-concept originates from biology and is based on the idea that higher suc-
cess reects an advantage in reproducing. In an economic context, of course, success is
mostly identied with monetary payos. One can directly extend the idea of evolutionary
stability to this context when monetary payo is an important determinant for repro-
ductive success. Indeed, some empirical evidence indicates that, over the more recent
human history, individual wealth has been positively related to the number of surviving
ospring.6 For the economist, however, the social mechanisms of learning and imitation
are probably more important than the genetic mechanism: Evolutionary selection occurs
because successful behavioral attitudes tend to be imitated. Individual traits that yield
lower payos will, therefore, be driven out by more successful traits. In this way, imita-
tion may induce a process that resembles natural selection or the `survival of the ttest'.7
We rst apply the ESS-concept to the case k > 0; where the players' interactions
exhibit strategic complementarities. By Lemmas 4 - 6 in the Appendix we get the fol-
lowing result.
Proposition 3: Let k > 0: Then  = (2   k)=2 is the unique evolutionarily stable
preference parameter.
As  < 1; evolutionarily stable preferences must exhibit some degree of altruism.
The level of altruism is positively related to the parameter k: Altruism becomes more
important when the strategic interdependence between the players is relatively high. In
fact, k ! 1 implies  ! 1=2:
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Why can an egoistic mutant with  >  not invade a population of -individuals?
Actually, by Proposition 2, such a mutant has a higher success than the member of the
population with whom he interacts. Yet, the low payo of an -player against an in-
vading mutant is less important for evolutionary considerations. For the members of the
population the likelihood of interacting with the mutant is small. Mostly they interact
with each other and so, by Proposition 1, their expected level of success is relatively
high. The parameter  < 1 is evolutionarily stable because in the game between a pair
of - individuals each of them gets a larger material payo than the egoist against an
-opponent.
Also, the uniqueness of  in Proposition 3 implies that a population of egoists is
vulnerable against invasion by altruistic agents. This is so because the interaction be-
tween the egoists results in low payos. If an altruist enters a population of egoists, his
payo will be lower than the one of his partner. Nonetheless, he is still more successful
than all the other egoists who have an egoist as their partner. This happens because
preferences have a strategic eect: As it was shown in the foregoing section, the altruist
induces his opponent to increase his action level. In the case of positive externalities,
this is benecial and so he will succeed in invading a society of egoists.
The last argument indicates that the sign of k may be important for the evolution
of altruism. In fact, the following result reveals that egoistic preferences are the unique
evolutionary outcome in the case of strategic substitutes.
Proposition 4: Let k < 0: Then  = 1 is the unique evolutionarily stable preference
parameter.
The proof of this statement follows immediately from Lemmas 4 - 6 in the Appendix.
Propositions 3 and 4 reveal that the survival of altruism depends on the environment.
It is consistent with evolutionary stability that individuals behave altruistically in some
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situations and egoistically in others. Our simple example of strategic interactions demon-
strates this by the dependence of  upon the parameter k: When k < 0; a population
of egoists will defeat entry of altruism. On average the egoists will be more successful
than an invading mutant. In fact, an altruistic entrant will suer for two reasons. First,
his choice of action does not aim at maximizing private success. Second, as k < 0; the
strategic eect of his attitude turns out to be harmful. His egoistic opponent will choose
a higher action level when facing an altruist. In the presence of negative externalities
this lowers the altruist's payo.
In terms of the examples discussed in section 2, our analysis shows that altruism
emerges in the presence of positive production externalities, in the case of output shar-
ing, or in a Bertrand market. Self-interest is stable in an environment with negative
production externalities, with common resource exploitation, and in a Cournot mar-
ket. The strategic eect of preferences explains why altruism is evolutionarily stable
for k > 0; whereas egoism is evolutionarily stable for k < 0: When altruism induces a
harmful reaction by the other player, one is better o by egoistically maximizing private
success. Altruism may emerge only if its strategic eect is benecial. In this situation,
the evolutionarily stable parameter  is determined by the following tradeo. On the
one hand, the altruist reduces his success by choosing an action that reects some con-
cern for the other player's success; on the other hand, his attitude causes a favorable
reaction by the other player. The latter eect becomes more important for larger values
of k: Therefore,  and k are negatively related.
6 A Generalization
In the previous sections we have employed the parametric specication of material pay-
os in equation (1) to study the evolutionary stability of altruism. For this specication,
the equilibrium dened by (10) is uniquely determined so that the function R(; ) in
(15) is unambiguously dened. Moreover, there is a unique preference parameter  sat-
isfying conditions (16) and (17) for evolutionary stability. For general success functions,
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this may no longer be the case. Even when the evolutionary game in section 5 is well-
dened, it may happen that the parameter  is not unique or that an evolutionarily
stable parameter does not exist. Nonetheless, we can extend our main conclusions to a
more general framework.
In this section, we will generalize the specication of material payos. As before, we
consider a monomorphic population of players who interact pairwise. The game between
any pair of players, say player 1 and player 2, determines their evolutionary success.
This is represented by the functions U1(x; y) and U2(x; y); where x and y are the ac-
tions chosen by player 1 and 2, respectively. The game is symmetric in the sense that
U1(x; y) = U2(y; x): By symmetry, the payo of a strategy is independent of whether the
player acts in the role of player 1 or player 2. We assume U1(; ) to be strictly concave
and twice dierentiable.
To characterize the interaction between the players, we extend the terminology in
the previous sections to the more general case. Let the signs of @U1(x; y)=@y and
@
2
U1(x; y)=@x@y be constant for all (x; y)  0: The game is said to exhibit positive
externalities if @U1(x; y)=@y > 0 and negative externalities if @U1(x; y)=@y < 0: The
players face strategic complementarities if @2U1(x; y)=@x@y > 0 and strategic substi-
tutes if @2U1(x; y)=@x@y < 0: We focus on situations where @U1(x; y)=@y 6= 0 and
@
2
U1(x; y)=@x@y 6= 0 for all (x; y)  0:
Whenever two individuals interact with each other, each player i seeks to maximize
his subjective utility Vi(x; y); as dened by (8). An equilibrium is a pair of actions,
(x(; ); y(; )); that satises condition (10). As long as @U1(0; y
)=@x is suciently
large, the equilibrium actions satisfy x > 0 and y > 0 so that they can be derived from
the rst order conditions
@V1(x




(; ); y(; ))
@y
= 0: (18)
To ensure that R(; ) in (15) is well-dened, we assume that (18) has a unique solution
(x(; ); y(; )):8
16
The evolutionary success of preferences depends on their impact on equilibrium be-






































The eect described by (19) has the same intuition as in the more special case studied
before. The more altruistic player 1 is, i.e. the lower  is, the more he tends to internal-
ize the externality of his action upon the other player's utility. Therefore,  and x are
negatively related in games with positive externalities and positively related in games
with negative externalities. Equation (20) generalizes the strategic eect discussed in
the previous sections. As before, altruism induces the opponent to select a higher ac-
tion when both the externalities and the strategic interdependence between the players'
actions have the same sign. But, in the more general situation considered here, altru-
ism may also reduce the other player's equilibrium action. This happens in games with
strategic complements when the externalities are negative and in games with strategic
substitutes when the externalities are positive.
How does the strategic eect inuence a player's success? Consider a game with
strategic complements. If the game has positive externalities, then altruism induces the
opponent to choose a higher action level. Clearly, this eect is benecial for the altruist's
success since, in the presence of positive externalities, raising the other player's action
level increases his own success. Similarly, in a game with strategic complements and
negative externalities altruism reduces the opponent's action level. Again, the altruist
gains from the strategic eect. In games with strategic substitutes this conclusion is
reversed. For instance, in games with strategic substitutes and negative externalities,
altruism increases the other player's action. This is harmful because it creates a negative
externality. In summary, the strategic eect of altruism on the other player's behavior
is benecial in games with strategic complements and harmful in games with strategic
substitutes.
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Our previous analysis suggests that altruism survives evolutionary selection only if it
is associated with a benecial strategic eect. The following result, which is proved in
the Appendix, extends this conclusion to the more general environment.
Proposition 5: The preference parameter  = 1 is evolutionarily stable only if the
interactions between individuals are characterized by strategic substitutes. A parameter


< 1 is evolutionarily stable only if these interactions involve strategic complements.
This result is weaker than Propositions 3 and 4 because it does not establish the
existence or uniqueness of an evolutionarily stable preference parameter. Nonetheless, it
shows that pure egoism cannot evolve in an environment with strategic complementar-
ities. In such an environment only some form of altruism has the potential to survive
evolutionary selection. Conversely, altruism will not survive the invasion of egoistic mu-
tants when interactions exhibit strategic substitutes. The evolution of altruism requires
an environment of strategic complements. Altogether, one should not expect evolution
to result in a society where individuals always either pursue pure self-interest or care for
the well-being of others. Instead, evolutionary arguments suggest that these attitudes
will be contingent on the strategic interdependence between individual behaviors.
7 Conclusions
Unlike other evolutionary studies of altruistic behavior in strategic interaction, our indi-
rect evolutionary approach does not deny rational decision making. In principle it allows
for any hypotheses specifying how stimuli, e.g. preferences, inuence behavior. A pro-
cess of natural or cultural selection then determines which stimuli emerge in the course
of evolution. Our study employs the usual rationality assumptions of game theory to
endogenize preferences, which neoclassical theory typically treats as exogenous. In this
sense, the indirect evolutionary approach generalizes neoclassical theory.
18
The most important nding of our study is that evolutionarily stable altruism de-
pends on the type of strategic interaction, as expressed by the signs of the derivatives
of material payos Ui(x; y): Although in our context altruism always produces more ef-
cient outcomes, it is evolutionarily stable only if it induces the interaction partner to
respond favorably. As the evolution of preferences depends on this strategic eect, one
may expect altruism to mitigate ineciencies only when interactions can be character-
ized as strategic complements.
Another requirement for the evolution of altruism is related to the individuals' in-
formation about preferences. Our analysis employs the usual common knowledge as-
sumption of game theory, which implies that the preference parameters  and  are
commonly known. To illustrate the possible impact of incomplete information, consider
a monomorphic population of altruists with parameter  < 1: If now an egoistic mutant
appears, each altruist will consider the probability of interacting with the mutant as
negligible. Under incomplete information, the egoist will be treated as an altruist and
he will earn a higher material payo than his altruistic encounter. As result, altruism
will become vulnerable against egoistic mutants.
Our analysis, therefore, suggests that altruism is more likely to emerge in societies
where individuals are not anonymous. For instance, altruism may be restricted to rel-
atives and close friends. In contrast with the kin-selection selection argument, in our
framework this happens not because family members are genetically linked but because
they are better informed about each other. Nonetheless, even when preferences are not
directly known, altruism may evolve if there are signals that indicate a person's attitude.
In addition to the physical symptoms mentioned by Frank (1987, 1988), for instance do-
nations to charities might signal altrustic preferences. An egoist is less willing than an
altruist to donate. If imitation is too costly for the egoist, donations can become a
credible signal of altruism.
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2(k + 2)[k2(  1) + k(2  1) + 2]
(k2   4)2
: (21)
Therefore, @R(; )=@ = 0 is equivalent to
 = [4 + k(2   k)]=[4( + k)]: (22)
Setting  =  =  and solving the resulting quadratic equation for  leads to the two
solutions stated in the Lemma. Q.E.D.
Lemma 2: The parameter  =  k=2 is not evolutionarily stable.
Proof: Since R(; k=2) = m2=4;  =  k=2 satises the rst requirement of stability.
The second requirement, R(;) > R(;) is equivalent to the condition (k + 1) < k:
As (k + 1) > 0; this implies k > 0: But then  < 0; a contradiction. Q.E.D.
Lemma 3: The parameter  = 1=2 is not evolutionarily stable.
Proof: Straightforward calculations show that for  >  = 1=2 the requirement
R(; )  R(; ) is equivalent to
[k2 + k(2  1)  1]=[k   1]  0: (23)
As k < 1 this is equivalent to k2 + k(2   1)  1: If k > 0; this condition cannot hold
for  close enough to 1=2: If k < 0; then (23) holds for  = 1 only if k2+ k  1: But for
 1 < k < 0 one cannot have k2 + k  1: This proves that  = 1=2 does not satisfy the
rst requirement of evolutionary stability. Q.E.D.
Lemma 4: Let  be evolutionarily stable. Then either  = 1 or  = (2   k)=2:
Proof: The statement simply follows from the fact that by the rst requirement of evo-
lutionary stability one must have @R(; )=@ = 0 whenever 1=2 <  < 1: By Lemma
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1, this equality has exactly two solutions, k=2 and (2   k)=2: Lemmas 2 and 3 elimi-
nate the possibility that  =  k=2 or  = 1=2 are evolutionary stable. This leaves only
the two values  = 1 and  = (2 k)=2 as candidates for evolutionary stability. Q.E.D.
Lemma 5: The parameter  = (2   k)=2 is evolutionarily stable if and only if k > 0:
Proof: Note that, by assumption (2),  2 [1=2; 1] if and only if k  0: Straightforward
calculations show that for  = (2 k)=2 the inequalityR(; )  R(;) is equivalent
to
[k2   4][k   2(1  )]2=[k   1]  0: (24)
By assumption (2) this inequality is always satised. The inequality also shows that
R(; ) > R(;) for  6= : This proves that also the second requirement of evolu-
tionary stability is satised. Q.E.D.
Lemma 6: The parameter  = 1 is evolutionarily stable if and only if k < 0:
Proof: Straightforward calculations show that for  <  = 1 the requirement
R(; )  R(;) is equivalent to
k3   2k2(1   )  4k + 4(1  )  0: (25)
For k 2 (0; 1) this condition does not hold for  close enough to unity. But for
k 2 ( 1; 0] it holds for all  2 [1=2; 1] so that the rst requirement of evolutionary
stability is satised. Indeed, since the strict inequality holds in (25) for  < 1; one has
R(; ) > R(;): Therefore, also the second requirement of evolutionary stability is
satised. Q.E.D.
Lemma 7: U1(x
(; ); y(; )) < U2(x
(; ); y(; )); for all  < ;k 6= 0:
Proof: By symmetry of the functions U1(); U2() and by denition of R(; ); the state-
ment of the Lemma is equivalent to R(; ) < R(; );  < : Using the expression for
R() from Lemma 1, this is equivalent to k2(k++) > 0: By (2) and (9), this inequality
is always satised if k 6= 0: Q.E.D.
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Suppose that the game exhibits strategic complements and that  = 1: Then  =
1 together with (8) and (18) implies @U1(x
; y)=@x = 0: This in combination with
@2U1(x; y)=@x@y > 0; and (20) implies dR(
; )=d < 0: Thus for some  < 1 in the
neighborhood of  one gets R(; ) < R(;); a contradiction to requirement (16).
This proves that  = 1 only if the game exhibits strategic substitutes.
Now suppose that the game exhibits strategic substitutes and that  < 1: Then (8)
and (18) imply @U1(x
; y)=@x =  (1  )=  @U2(x
; y)=@x: By (19) and symmetry
of Ui(); this yields @U1(x
; y)=@x dx=d > 0: Similarly, @2U1(x; y)=@x@y < 0 and (20)
imply @U1(x
; y)=@y dy=d > 0: Therefore, dR(; )=d > 0: Thus for some  > 
in the neighborhood of  one gets R(; ) < R(;); a contradiction to requirement
(16). This proves that  < 1 only if the game exhibits strategic complements. Q.E.D.
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Footnotes
1. Note that also in evolutionary biology one often considers the assumption of geneti-
cally determined behavior as questionable (see van Lawick-Goodall (1974)). Higher
developed species like mammals live in such a complex and stochastic environment
that a genetically determined reaction behavior to all circumstances appears to be
impossible.
2. The exceptions include Becker (1976), Frank (1987) and, more recently, Guth and
Yaari (1992), Guth and Kliemt (1994), Hanson and Stuart (1990), Rabin (1993),
Rogers (1994), and Waldman (1994).
3. A strategy xs is evolutionarily stable if (i) U1(x
s; xs)  U1(y; x
s) for all y; and (ii)
U1(x
s; y) > U1(y; y) whenever U1(x
s; xs) = U1(y; x
s):
4. For a brief presentation of some evidence, see Rabin (1993) who incorporates these
facts by deriving a `psychological game' from basic `material games'.
5. A setting in which altruism induces inecient behavior is studied by Lindbeck
and Weibull (1988). For a discussion of the eciency aspects of altruism, see also
Friedman (1988).
6. See, e.g., Chagnon and Irons (1979) or Boyer (1989).
7. See, e.g., Mailath (1992) and Selten (1991) for a discussion. Bjornerstedt and
Weibull (1994) show that population dynamics based on imitation may be closely
related to biological dynamics.
8. Friedman (1986, p.42) presents conditions guaranteeing a unique equilibrium.
9. In the derivation of (19) and (20) we use the symmetry of the game and the fact
that Vi() is strictly concave.
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